Computing Nash equilibria for strategic multi-agent systems is challenging for expensive black box systems. Motivated by the ubiquity of games involving exploitation of common resources, this paper considers the above problem for potential games. We use the Bayesian optimization framework to obtain novel algorithms to solve nite (discrete action spaces) and in nite (real interval action spaces) potential games, utilizing the structure of potential games. Numerical results illustrate the e ciency of the approach in computing the Nash equilibria of static potential games and linear Nash equilibria of dynamic potential games.
INTRODUCTION
Modeling strategic behavior in multi-agent systems using game theory has a rich history. Applications of game theory include a wide range of economic phenomena such as auctions [17] , oligopolies, social network formation [15] , behavioral economics and political economics; just to name a few.
e most common solution concept used to analyze the outcome of such a strategic interaction is the Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, no player bene ts by deviating from their strategy [24] . In general, the Nash equilibrium is found as the xed point solution of multiple single optimization problems.
Potential games are an important class of games rst de ned in [29] and later popularized by [20] ; refer to [9] for a recent survey. e key property of potential games is the existence of a function, called the potential function, such that optimizing the potential function gives the Nash equilibrium. Potential games have been extensively used in the context of exploitation of common economic resource, such as in mining and shing; see, for example, the survey [32] . Potential games are a natural model when the bene ts that a player derives from the use of a facility is proportional to the total number of users of the same facility. An important class of potential games is that of congestion games [36] , widely used for understanding * Figure 1 : Example of a game with a black box utility function: Secure cloud computing. Each 'secure' agent is unwilling to disclose its private utility function. e system operator is only able to compute the equilibria using the realized values of the private utility functions.
road transportation in urban areas [4] and in uence in social networks [14] . In the context of decision making under uncertainty and risk, [3] proposed potential games as a model for interdependent preference. In addition, potential games nds use in power control in wireless network [10, 31] and cognitive radio network [21] .
ere is an extensive literature on the techniques and algorithms for computing Nash equilibria of games, including potential games; see for example [2] . However, very li le is known about computing Nash equilibria of 'black box' utility function or 'expensive to evaluate' utility functions. [18] gives the example of a secure cloud computing system as shown in Figure 1 . Each 'secure' agent is unwilling to disclose its private utility function. e system operator is only able to compute the equilibrium using the realized values of the private utility functions. Other examples include extraction of economic resource such as water or mining where a regulator, which takes into account strategic interaction between players, have some control over the actions of the players. To the best of our knowledge, only [25] address this problem for general games. However, several problems of exploitation of common resources, such as the cloud computing problem in [18] (Figure 1) , can be modeled using potential games. Hence, in this paper, we consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria of potential games with 'black box' utility functions.
Main results and Organization: Section 2.1 provides a brief introduction to potential games and their important properties. Gaussian processes [28] are a powerful, non-parametric Bayesian approach of learning and optimizing unknown functions e ciently. Section 2.2 summarizes important results from Gaussian process regression, the framework adopted in this paper. Since potential games are characterized by a potential function, we impose a Gaussian process on the unknown potential function. e key di erence between the above formulation to the standard Gaussian process regression in [28] and the formulation for general games in [25] is that the function (the potential in this case), on which the Gaussian process is imposed, is not directly observed. However, the utility of each player, which is related to the potential function, can be measured; commonly referred to as bandit feedback in the potential game literature [11] . is paper has the following main results: (i) Section 3 derives an algorithm (Algorithm 1) for e ciently computing the Nash equilibrium of potential games with nite action sets, with 'black box' utility functions. (ii) Similarly, Section 4 derives an algorithm (Algorithm 2) to compute the Nash equilibria for potential games with continuous action sets. When action sets are continuous, bandit feedback provides noisy integral of the gradients of potential function; see (5) . Algorithm 2 presents a method which simultaneously estimates the gradient (from bandit feedback) and optimizes the unknown function using Gaussian processes. (iii) Section 5 presents numerical results illustrating the e ciency of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 in computing the Nash equilibrium of static games and linear Nash equilibrium of dynamic potential games, compared to existing techniques. Concluding remarks are o ered in Section 6.
Context and Related Literature:
e problem considered in this paper (see, for example, Figure 1 ) can be compared to the no-regret learning framework in classical game theory. In no-regret learning, each player, simultaneously, chooses a mixed strategy (a distribution over the action set) and obtains a pay-o associated with the strategy. e players keep a 'score' based on the obtained pay-o . e mixed strategy is chosen based on the score; the most popular method being the exponential or the multiplicative weight algorithm [30] . In the context of potential games [11] and [5] show that the exponential weight algorithm converges to the Nash equilibrium with bandit feedback.
Inferring the unknown utilities of agents has a rich history in the revealed preference literature [35] in micro-economics. e revealed preference framework has been extended to the case of multiagent systems in the context of potential games in [6, 13] . However, in comparison, this paper considers the problem of computing the Nash equilibrium, rather than characterizing the utility functions.
Notation: In this paper, vectors are denoted by lower case le ers, e.g., x, while matrices are denoted by upper case le ers, e.g., K. For a vector x, x denotes its transpose, while for a function f , f denotes its derivative. e players are indexed by i and j, and k and l denote sequence indices. For a vector x, the i th component (usually, corresponding to a player) is denoted (in subscript) by x i . However, the sequence index is given in the superscript, e.g., x k . Time is denoted by t. Finally, the symbol ∼ is used to mean 'distributed as'.
PRELIMINARIES
We introduce potential games in Sec. 2.1 and summarize the Gaussian process regression results in Sec. 2.2.
Potential Games
Consider a game with nite number of players 1 . e set of players is denoted by I = {1, 2, · · · , I }. Player i chooses an action from X i , the possible set of actions for player i. Let x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x I ) denotes the actions of all the players. e utility function (or payo ) of player i as a function of actions taken by all the players is given by u i : X → I R, where I R denotes the real line, and X = X 1 × X 2 × · · · X I . e objective of each player is to maximize its utility function and is given by
In the following, we will denote x = (x i , x −i ), where x −i denotes the actions of all players other than player i. A popular concept to analyze the solution of such a strategic game is the Nash equilibrium. A solution x * is a Nash equilibrium if
i.e. no player bene ts by deviating from x * .
D 1 ([20]).
A game is called a potential game if there exists a function Φ : X → I R, called the potential function, such that
A nite potential game (potential game with nite action sets) has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium [20] , i.e. a solution exists for (2) . Another important property of potential games is the existence of a Finite Improvement Path (FIP) [20] . A path is a sequence of actions x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k , . . . such that, for some player i, x k = , x k −1 −i ; player i is referred to as the unique deviator at k. Given a path, the unique deviator at k can be de ned as:
A path is called an improvement path if
e FIP property for nite potential games states that every such improvement path is nite 2 .
In nite Potential game: e following lemma gives the equivalent de nition of potential function for potential games with continuous action sets.
. Consider a game where the action sets are intervals of real numbers. Suppose, the utility function u i : X → I R is bounded and continuously di erentiable and let Φ : X → I R. en, Φ is a potential if and only if Φ is continuously di erentiable, and
Similar to the FIP property of nite games, in nite potential games have an approximate nite improvement property [20] .
Gaussian Processes
A Gaussian process f indexed by X is a stochastic process such that for every nite collection
is a Gaussian random vector [28] .
e advantage of a Gaussian process is that it is completely speci ed by the mean and the covariance functions de ned as follows:
. (6) e mean and covariance function (and associated hyperparameters) encode our prior information about the model. Hence, we denote the Gaussian process by f ∼ GP (µ, κ).
It can be seen from (6) thatf is Gaussian distributed with mean µ and covariance matrix K, i.e.f ∼ N (µ, K). For any x * , the predictive distribution is Gaussian, i.e. f (x * )|{x * ,f , x } ∼ N (µ * , σ 2 * ) with mean and variance given by:
where,
An important property is that any a ne transformation of a Gaussian process is also a Gaussian process. In particular, in this paper, we are interested in di erential and integral operators. Hence, the prior mean over ∂ f /∂x i is given by µ D i = ∂µ/∂x i , and the covariance function is given by
In addition, the covariance function between the function and its derivative is given by
e integral operator will be introduced in Sec. 4.
NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR FINITE POTENTIAL GAMES
Since potential games are characterized by the potential function, we use a Gaussian Process model for the potential function, i.e. Φ ∼ GP (µ, κ) .
(10) e utility function of each player is measured as below:
where ε i,k is zero mean white Gaussian noise with variance
Motivated by the FIP property, we propose the following sequential strategy for computing the Nash equilibrium. Let x k −1 be the current action in the path. Consider all possible actions x that di er only in the action of player from
. For computing the next action in the path, we would have chosen an action that improves the utility of player x, x k −1 , where with an abuse of notation x, x k −1 denotes the unique deviator between x and x k −1 as in (4) . However, since the unknown potential function (and hence the utility function) is modeled using a random function, we will use the following one-step lookahead criterion [23] .
e one-step lookahead criterion automatically promotes trade-o between exploration and exploitation; see discussion in [23] . e one-step lookahead criterion is very similar to the classical expected improvement criterion [16] . e one-step lookahead criterion selecting the action that maximizes the following 'utility function'
where, [x] + = max {x, 0}. However, from the de nition of potential games in (3),
and
. Since the potential function is modeled as a Gaussian process in (10), Φ is Gaussian, i.e.Φ ∼ N (µ, K), with mean µ(k) = µ(x k ), and
where, B is the di erencing matrix given by
Consider the partition of the mean and the covariance matrix in (14) as below:
e posterior distribution of Z given the observations ∆Y in (13) can be obtained using (7) as Gaussian with mean and variance given by
where, we have used the fact that ∆ k ∆u k , being the difference of two Gaussian variables has variance 2ν 2 ; see (11) . Given the mean and variance in (16) , it can be shown that [23] 
where, φ is the standard Gaussian distribution.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the Bayesian optimization approach to compute Nash equilibria in nite potential games. 
Compute ∆Y according to (13) . 5 :
Compute mean and covariance of Z using the partitions from (15) according to (16) . 7: Compute E [Z ] + according to (17) . Choose x k = argmax
is section considers potential games with continuous action sets. When action sets are continuous, the potential function of the game is related to the utility function of the players through the derivative as in (5) . Similar to nite potential games, we propose generating a path. Let x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x k −1 be the current state of the path. Let the next action in the path be x k = , x k −1 −i . We propose to update as below:
e gradient algorithm in (18) 
Estimating the potential gradient
Let,
, where i is the unique deviator from k − 1 to k. Consider the path:
en, ∫
where the rst equality in (20) follows from the fact that the line integral of a scalar eld, such as the potential, depends only on the end points. e second equality in (20) follows from the de nition of the potential games in (3) . e integral in (20) can be re-wri en as follows:
where the rst equality is obtained by 'total derivative' formulae, and the last equality is due to i being the unique deviator from x k −1 to x k . Hence, from (20) and (21), the change in utility ∆u k i can be interpreted as integral observations of the di erential of the potential along the x i direction.
De ne,
Using the vectors in (22) , along the path, (21) can be wri en in vector notation as
where, ∆U is as in (13) and is the Hadamard (point-wise) product. ∆U is a Gaussian process since it is obtained by linear operators on the gradient of the potential function which is a Gaussian process. Let the potential gradient vector be denoted
. e joint Gaussian process can be shown to be equal to
where, r k (τ ) is the path in (19) , ∆x k is as in (13), and µ D and κ (D, D) are the mean and covariance function of the Gaussian
e posterior distribution process of the potential gradient can be obtained using (7) as
where, ∆Y is as in (13) and we have again used the fact that ∆ k ∆u k , being the di erence of two Gaussian variables, has variance 2ν 2 . Having estimated the potential gradient, the next section considers the problem of selecting the step size.
Choosing the step size
e ideal step size for a gradient algorithm such as the one in (18) is given by the second derivative (or the Hessian). However, obtaining the second derivatives is computationally taxing. Hence, a practical strategy is to perform a line search. A line search algorithm tries a sequence of candidate value of step size, and stops to accept one of the candidate values when the conditions are 'acceptable'. A popular method of line search is given by the backtracing algorithm.
e key idea of backtracing is to start with a maximum step size, i.e. δ 0 = δ max and then iteratively generate step sizes as follows: δ m = βδ m−1 , β ∈ (0, 1) being the backtracing parameter, until an 'acceptable' step size is found. e following conditions popularly known as Wolfe conditions [22] provide step size that ensures convergence of a gradient algorithm.
D 2 (W '
). Given a function f and an ascent direction p, i.e. p f (x k ) > 0, with 0 < c 1 < c 2 ≤ 1, a step-size δ is acceptable if:
e rst condition ensures that there is 'su cient' increase in function value in the direction p.
e second condition ensures that the slope of the function decreases. Typically the values are chosen as: c 1 = 1 × 10 −4 and c 2 = 0.8 [22] . In the Bayesian optimization framework, [19] derives a probabilistic approach to the Wolfe conditions. e key idea in [19] is to compute the probability that the Wolfe conditions in Defn. 2 are satis ed and then only consider candidates that pass a threshold, denoted by c w .
Computing the probability of Wolfe conditions: From Defn. 2, computing the probability of Wolfe conditions require modelling the function along with its derivatives. In addition, we need to choose the ascent direction p. Choosing to update player i in (18), we choose the ascent direction as below:
where, e i is the standard basis vector. e posterior distribution of ∂Φ/∂x i is obtained from (25) in Sec. 4.1.
Let the step size be δ . For player i, de nex k = x k + δp i , the next possible action in the path, where the ascent direction p i is given by (26) . Let Φ i be the vector of potential value atx k and x k , i.e. Φ i = Φ(x k ), Φ(x k )), and, Φ ∂,i be the gradient of Φ i with respect to x i , i.e. Φ ∂,i = (∂Φ(x k )/∂x i , ∂Φ(x k )/∂x i ). e joint Gaussian process of Φ i , Φ ∂,i and the observations ∆U in (13) can be shown to be equal to
where, µ ∆U , γ and π are as in (24) . κ D is the covariance between the observation and its derivative, see Sec. 2.2. Using the kernel κ D , η in (27) is
where, r k (τ ) is the path de ned in (21) . e posterior distribution of Φ i , Φ ∂,i ∼ GP µ δ , κ δ can be obtained similar to (25) , as follows
Similar to (25), we have used the fact that ∆ k ∆u k , being the di erence of two Gaussian variables, has variance 2ν 2 .
e Wolfe conditions in Defn. 2 in vector notation is as follows:
en, a k and b k in (30) are jointly Gaussian. e probability that the Wolfe conditions are satis ed is given by P w = P((a k ≥ 0)&(b k ≥ 0)). Several packages, such as the one in [8] , are available to compute this probability e ciently.
Choosing the player to update
Section 4.1 considered the problem of estimating the gradient of the potential function and Sec. 4.2 considered the problem of selecting an 'acceptable' step size δ i (probability of Wolfe condition above the c w threshold), for each player i.
In this section, we consider the problem of choosing which player to update. As in the nite potential games, we select the player which provides the maximum 'expected improvement' in the one-step lookahead criterion (12), i.e.
It is straightforward to compute (31) using the posterior probability in (29) and the formulae in (17) .
Algorithm 2 summarizes the various steps explained above to compute the Nash equilibrium for in nite potential games.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we apply the methods in Sec. 3 and Sec. 4 to compute the Nash equilibrium of static potential games and the linear Nash equilibrium of dynamic potential games. In this numerical section, we will use the following choice of mean and covariance function:
where, the hyperparameters λ j , known as the input scale length, determines the relevance of each dimension. e hyperparameter controls the magnitude of the output. Se ing Estimate gradients using (25). 4 :
Choose ascent direction p i using (26). 6: δ i = δ max .
7:
repeat 8: Compute Wolfe probability P w using (29)-(30). 9: Reduce step size δ i = βδ i 10: until { P w ≥ c w }
11:
end for 12: Choose player i * according to (31) . 13: Update x k according to (18) with step-size δ i * 14: end for the mean function to zero is motivated by the ordinal nature 3 of the utility function of the players (and, hence the potential function). e choice of the squared exponential kernel κ se is motivated by (i) Lemma 1 requires that the potential function be continuously di erentiable, (ii) existence of analytical expressions for the kernels in (8) and (9) . In particular, for the squared exponential kernel:
where, δ i, j is the Kronecker delta function.
Static Potential Games: Cournot oligopoly
Cournot oligopoly is a market with I players for a single good, where each player manufactures a certain quantity of good given by q i . e price is dictated by the market and is a function of the total quantity produced by all the players, given by p = a − bQ, where Q = i q i and a, b > 0. Each player has a cost function given by c i (q i ), a function of the quantity produced by each player. e Cournot oligopoly is known to be a potential game [20] .
To illustrate the main results, we consider a version of the problem with 2 players, with the following parameters:
where, we have used the exponential cost function for the players in (33) . e parameter β i characterizes the rate of growth of cost [37] . e rst player models an agent with low rate of cost growth (β 1 < 1) i.e. the agent pro ts from more production. However, the second player models an agent with high rate of cost growth (β 2 > 1), i.e. the payo decreases with more production. Each agent sells quantity q i at price p. e utility of the player is the pro t given in (33) .
As can be seen that the price goes to zero when Q = 10. Hence, we restrict our search space from (0, 10]. Due to the nature of the cost function in (33), straight-forward analytic methods cannot be used for computing the Nash equilibrium, even for the case of a 2 player game.
Finite Game Formulation: e action space of the Cournot problem is continuous. To apply the nite game formulation in Sec. 3, we discretize the action space into a 31 × 31 grid. Algorithm 1 is run with the following parameters:
Algorithm 1 is terminated when the one-step lookahead criterion in (12) is less than 5 × 10 −2 .
First, we compare Algorithm 1 with GPGame [25] , which can used for 'black box' utility functions of general games. GPGame requires an initial set of 'space lling' measurements. As suggested in [25] , we set the number of initial measurements to be 11. To enable comparison, we initialized Algorithm 1 with the same initial conditions. Table 1 compares the number of iterations required by Algorithm 1 and GPGame.
In Table 1 , we used 'Probability of Nash Equilibrium' de ned in [25] as the criterion for GPGame. Algorithm 1 performs better than GPGame in this setup. Algorithm 1 utilizes the structure of the potential game, i.e. the optimization of the potential function leads to Nash equilibrium. In addition, GPGame requires estimating I negative quadrant probabilities of multivariate Gaussians of size |X i |, which is computationally expensive. In comparison, estimating the one-step lookahead criterion in (12) is analytic (refer to (17)).
Finally, we also compute the equilibrium through the exponential weight algorithm, under the no-regret learning framework. e exponential weights algorithm is shown to work in potential games, even when only the measurements of the utility function are available, using the bandit estimator dened in [11] . However, due to the absence of a central agent (system operator), the exponential weights algorithm di ers from the se ing considered in this paper; see Figure 1 . Table 1 shows the comparison of the number of iterations between Algorithm 1 and the exponential weight algorithm in [11] . In comparison to the exponential weight algorithm, Algorithm 1 requires only a fraction of the number of iterations. However, the exponential weight algorithm has the advantage that it is fully distributed.
In nite Game Formulation: e experiment was repeated with the formulation of continuous action sets in Sec. 4. To run Algorithm 2, the following parameters were chosen:
2-3 GPGame [11] 4-5 Exponential weight [11] 200 Table 1 : Comparison between the number of iterations between the various algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in nite potential games. In Algorithm 1 and GPGame, the number of initial 'space lling' measurements was set to 11. Algorithm 1 performs better than GPGame, and uses only a fraction of iterations compared to a completely distributed algorithm like the exponential weight algorithm. e path taken by the algorithm is shown in red. e path is superimposed on the contour plot of the potential function (unknown to Algorithm 2). It is easy to see that Algorithm 2 converges to the optimal solution. It can be noticed (from inset) that the algorithm initially selects larger step sizes as it explores the search space followed by smaller step sizes as it exploits the available information to reach the global optimum. Figure 2 shows the convergence of the Algorithm 2. e algorithm is terminated when the one-step lookahead criterion less than 1 × 10 −4 . e potential function for the Cournot example is analytic and is given in [20] . In Figure 2 , we also plot the contour plot of the potential function. From the inset in Fig. 2 it is easy to see that the algorithm converges to the optimal solution. Also, notice that the algorithm initially selects larger step sizes as it explores the search space followed by smaller step sizes as it exploits the available information to reach the global optimum, a property of the one-step lookahead criterion in (31) . e GPGame algorithm in [25] cannot be used when the action sets are continuous 4 .
To further illustrate the e ciency of Algorithm 2, we compared Algorithm 2 with a non-linear optimizer. For the non-linear optimizer, we used BOBYQA 5 [26] , an algorithm that uses a quadratic approximation of the objective function. e potential function for the Cournot example is given in [20] . Table 2 shows the comparison of the number of iterations averaged over 10 independent runs with varying start points. Both the non-linear optimizer and Algorithm 2 were provided with the same start points. Algorithm 2 is able to achieve similar performance to a non-linear optimizer with full knowledge of the objective (the potential function). 
Potential Di erential Games: Computing Linear Nash equilibrium
In Section 5.1, we illustrated the advantage of Bayesian optimization approach to static potential games. In this section, we consider dynamic potential games, in particular, dynamic potential games evolving in continuous times, referred to as di erential games 6 . Di erential games model a wide variety of interactions in economics, nance, sociology and biology; see for example [2] . In static potential games several techniques exist to nd the potential function given the utility functions of the players. However, in di erential potential games, and in general for dynamic games, computing the potential function is non-trivial, even with the knowledge of the utility function.
To illustrate the main results, we consider the following classical di erential game of a common pool of resource exploited by heterogeneous players [34] :
e state s in (36) represents the stock of the resource and a > 0 implies that the resource is renewable such as in shing or logging in forestry. e utility of player i when the game is played for a horizon of time T is given by:
where, x(t) = (x 1 (t), x 2 (t), · · · , x I (t)) is the action of all the players at time t and u i (·) is the instantaneous utility of each player as a function of the state and the action of all the players. e parameter θ i represents the discount rate of player i. e 5 BOBYQA performed the best among all the non-linear optimizers we tried. 6 Similar techniques also apply to discrete time dynamic potential games.
Nash equilibrium for a di erential game is de ned similarly to (2) as:
In the following, as a special case, we consider the following instantaneous utility function:
e parameter α i in (39) captures the classical economic notion of 'returns to scale', i.e. the rate of increase in payo (or utility) relative to investment (the action, in this case) . Industries such as mining have an increasing returns to scale (α i > 1), while computer technology have a decreasing returns to scale (α i ≤ 1). e structure of (39) ensures that (36) is a potential game. e above model also describe dynamics of single capital stock [7] and optimal dynamic scheduling for a common resource [1] .
Linear Control Strategies: In this paper, we focus on linear strategies, i.e. strategies of the form x i (t) = γ i s(t). e focus on linear strategies is primarily motivated by simplicity. In addition, linear strategies are known to be optimal when the state transition in (36) is linear in state and actions and the instantaneous objective function is homogeneous like in (39) [33] . However, the focus on linear strategies precludes some non-linear Nash control strategies.
Simulation Setup and Results:
To illustrate the main results, we consider a version of the problem in (36) with 2 players, with the following parameters: a = 0.9, s 0 = 1, α 1 = 0.3, α 2 = 0.2,
Adopting the linear strategy, the potential function is parameterized by γ 1 and γ 2 . For the linear strategy, the state evolution is exponential with parameter a − i γ i . e utilities in (37) were computed using numerical integration with 1 × 10 4 integration points. Algorithm 2 was run with the parameters given in (35) , except for the hyperparameters λ j = √ 7. Figure 3 shows the trajectory of the state and the linear strategy (actions of the players) a er 18 iterations of Algorithm 2. e 'true' Nash equilibrium for the problem in (36) can be computed using the methodology outlined in [34] . From Fig. 3 , it can be observed that the strategy computed from Algorithm 2 is 'close' to the Nash equilibrium.
Discussion
In Sec. 5.1 and Sec. 5.2, we illustrated the advantage of Bayesian optimization approach to computing Nash equilibria of 'black box' potential games. Even in the absence of knowledge of the utility function, the Nash equilibrium can be computed quite e ciently. However, this e ciency comes at a price. Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 require inverting a K × K matrix, which requires O(K 3 ) computations. Sparse Gaussian process techniques [27] and expressions can be found in [12] . However, computing π in (24) requires numerical integration. is could be computationally expensive as the number of players increase.
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we considered potential games with 'black box utility' functions. Using the Gaussian process framework and structure of potential games, we derived two novel algorithms; one for discrete action sets, and one for action sets with real intervals. We illustrated the e ciency of the algorithms, in terms of black box evaluations, for computing the Nash equilibrium of static games and the linear Nash equilibria of di erential games. In addition, the algorithms provide a general nonparametric technique to compute Nash equilibria of potential games, without explicitly computing the potential function.
Extensions of the current work could involve developing algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of population games, investigating sparse Gaussian process for reducing the computational complexity and computing closed loop Nash equilibrium of dynamic potential games. ese issues promise to o er interesting avenues for future work.
